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Abstract: In my recent translation (Ferraro 2016) from Sanskrit to Portuguese of
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā I have frequently consulted, among many
others, Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura’s English version (Siderits / Katsura
2013) of the same work. In this review article I present some places where my
understanding of Nāgārjuna’s words more markedly diverges from their transla-
tion. Regarding the ideal of “an English-speaking Nāgārjuna” as a work-in-
progress which could be constantly improved, my observations aim to continue
the list of remarks presented by Anne MacDonald in her review article
(MacDonald 2015) of Siderits and Katsura’s work.
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In her review of Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura’s Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way.
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Siderits / Katsura 2013), before offering “a few brief
remarks on S&K’s translation and interpretation of some randomly selected
kārikās” (MacDonald 2015: 360), Anne MacDonald presents some criticisms of the
methodology used by the two authors. In particular, according to her, a question-
able aspect of the work of Siderits and Katsura (hereafter S&K) is their choice to not
explicitly confront any of the several translations (in English and several other
modern languages) of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) or engage with any
modern critical study devoted to this or that individual chapter or kārikā of the
same work.
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In my recent translation (the first from Sanskrit to Portuguese) of the MMK
(Ferraro 2016), I had the lucky chance to consult with Professor MacDonald on
countless occasions, over the course of which she gave me many valuable
suggestions for how to deal, in general, with such a work, and also offered
dozens of punctual “solutions” for the more cryptic passages of Nāgārjuna’s
magnum opus. Therefore, I can say that my commented translation, among the
many defects which it – due to my personal scholarly limitations and inasmuch
as it is a translation – cannot but have, is devoid at least of some of those that
MacDonald identifies in S&K’s work.
In particular, in my version of the kārikās, I have frequently tried – within
the space limits allowed by the editor – to justify my lexical choices against
others, suggested by other authors. And obviously, since the publication of
S&K’s book, my comparison with it was punctual and systematic – actually,
for everyone who undertakes the enterprise of a new version of the MMK, S&K’s
translation is now an indispensable reference, because, despite the shortcom-
ings highlighted by MacDonald, it seems unquestionable that today it is, by far,
the best complete commented translation available in English. In this compar-
ison, several divergences have emerged (some of them also due to the different
final “linguistic containers”), some of them more macroscopic.
So, the primary aim of this paper is to point out some other passages,
besides those indicated by MacDonald in her review, in which S&K’s reading
seems more questionable; or, to put it in another way, I will try to justify my way
of understanding – sometimes, independently of my actual lexical choices – this
or that kārikā in comparison with S&K’s reading.
More generally, however, this article suggests that “the quest for an English
speaking Nāgārjuna” (MacDonald 2015: 357) ought to take the shape of a work-in-
progress inwhichdifferent scholars, starting from the best results achieveduntil now
in translating every verse of the MMK, identify the best solutions – those that, on the
basis of rigorous philological and hermeneutical criteria, prove to be, if not true, at
least less falsifiable than others – for rendering Nāgārjuna’s Sanskrit into English.
We observe, indeed, that nowadays, much more than ever was the case in the
past, it is possible to conceive of the work of translation – at least, translation into
English of the works of ancient authors as much studied as Nāgārjuna – as a
collective enterprise, developed on virtual platforms in which the possibilities of
comparison, exchange and access to bibliographical sources are almost unlimited.
MMK 2.22
gatyā yayājyate gantā gatiṃ tāṃ sa na gacchati |
yasmān na gatipūrvo ’sti kaścit kiṃcid dhi gacchati ||
A goer does not obtain that going through which it is called a goers,
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since the goer does not exist before the going; indeed someone goes somewhere –
(S&K 2013: 40)
Of this S&K’s translation, MacDonald (2015: 364–365) criticizes (1) the version of
ajyate as “is called” rather than “is manifested”; (2) “obtain” for gacchati,
instead of “go”; (3) “indeed” for hi, instead of “for”; (4) “somewhere” for
kiṃcid instead of “[on] something”.
I agree with the first three corrections, but I think that S&K have good
reasons to support their “somewhere” to render the kiṃcid of pāda d. Indeed,
they have the support of the commentators. For example, Buddhapālita glosses:
“Someone goes to something, e. g., a village and a city, since it is separated
[from him]” (BPV, tr. Saito 1984: 47); Bhāviveka: “Someone goes somewhere
[MMK 2.22.d]. [That is, he does] not [go] to his own self, because it is not possible
to act on one’s own self” (PP, tr. Ames 1995: 330); Candrakīrti: “We see that
someone, like Devadatta, goes [toward] something like a city or a village being
different [from him/from the place where he is now]” (PsP 106.7).
The problem here is that we a have an – unlike – transitive use of √gam,
with kiṃcid as its object. MacDonald surmises that this object is the place in
which the action of going happens, like, for example, one path. But here it
seems safer to follow the way in which Sanskrit speakers such as Buddhapālita,
Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti understand this object; that is, as the destination of
the action of going.
Thus “for someone goes somewhere” seems to me the best translation of
pāda d.
MMK 6.4ab
naikatve sahabhāvo ’sti na tenaiva hi tat saha
If there is unity [of state and subject] there is no co-occurrence; there is not that with
which the thing comes together – (S&K 2013: 68)
This is one of the cases pointed out by MacDonald (2015: 326) in which S&K
consider the particle hi to be pleonastic. Here (as in many other circumstances),
instead, its version as “for” seems recommendable. Furthermore, it seems
clear – with the backing of the commentators1 – that here tena should be
understood in a reflexive sense with respect to tat, and not as a distinct entity
with which tat would “come together”. The particle eva, which S&K do not
translate, has its common “emphatic” meaning, which in English is embedded
in the reflexive pronoun itself (but in Portuguese could be expressed by a
demonstrative adjective such as mesmo). Finally, following Candrakīrti (PsP
1 More clearly, ChL: “It is like a fingertip which cannot touch itself” (tr. Bocking 1993: 157).
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139.8), who considers this verse as a reply to the objection that rāga and rakta
could not occur “successively” (paurvāparyeṇa), the translation of sahabhāva
with “simultaneity” seems preferable to “co-occurrence”. This does not preclude
the possibility – as Bugault (2002: 96–97) remarks – that in the rest of the
chapter (beginning with the pādas cd of this same kārikā) sahabhāva has the
less temporal meaning of “co-existence”, “togetherness” or “co-occurrence”.
Thus, a most appropriate version of the half-verse would be: “There is no
simultaneity in identity, for something (tat) could not be simultaneous with itself
(tena)”.
MMK 6.9 cd
pṛthagbhāvāprasiddheś ca sahabhāvo na sidhyati |
katamasmin pṛthagbhāve sahabhāvaṃ satīcchasi ||
And if distinctness is not established, co-occurrence is not established.
If there is distinctness of the two, in which do you posit co-occurrence?
– (S&K 2013: 70)
S&K consider pṛthagbhāve … sati as a locative absolute (of hypothetical value)
and katamasmin as a simple locative, understood as a locative complement.
Alternatively, if we look at katamasmin as part of the locative absolute, we
get something like: “on the basis of which kind of alterity do you want/surmise
simultaneity?”.
In other words, Nāgārjuna, after observing in the first half-verse that if
otherness/distinctness is lacking then simultaneity is inadmissible, ironically
asks his opponent, in the second half-verse, whether perhaps some other kind
of otherness (different from that ruled out in the previous verses) exists, from
which simultaneity could be established.2
MMK 7.5ab
utpādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya te yadi |
[Reply:] If, according to you, origination is what originates the primary
origination […] – (S&K 2013: 75)
S&K recognize, in the translation of the previous kārikā, the
distinction – according to Candrakīrti, of sāṃmitīya origin (Prasannapadā,
PsP, 148.1) – between “origination of origination” (utpādotpāda) and
“primary origination” (mūlotpāda). However, here, for some reason, they
do not translate utpādotpāda as “origination of origination”.
2 A similar reading of this half-verse is what we find, again, in ChL: “In terms of what kind of
difference do you want to speak of a unity of characteristics?” (tr. Bocking 1993: 160).
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A more consistent version of the verse would be: “If, according to you,
origination of origination is the inception (utpāda) of primary origination […]”
MMK 8.2
sadbhūtasya kriyā nāsti karma ca syād akartṛkam |
sadbhūtasya kriyā nāsti kartā ca syād akarmakaḥ ||
There is no activity (kriyā) with respect to an agent that is real, [so] the
object would be without agent.
There is no activity with respect to an object that is real, so too the
agent would be without an object – (S&K 2013: 91)
The general sense of this verse is to argue in favor of what has been said in
the first half of the previous kārikā (8.1): “a real agent does not bring about a
real action” (sadbhūtaḥ kārakaḥ karma sadbhūtaṃ na karoty ayam).3
S&K closely follow the commentators’ readings – the one by Candrakīrti is
particularly clear – of this verse. For this, they take two “heavy” decisions:
(1) they render the same sentence – sadbhūtasya kriyā nâsti, in pādas a and
c – in two different ways; (2) they give the cas in pādas b and d a consecutive
meaning (which is not immediately present in the semantic range of ca).
Whilst I personally consider the interpretation of this kārikā made by S&K to
be consistent, however, the fact is that it is an interpretation and not an actual
translation (which should be open to more than one interpretation).
In this case, it would be better to leave to their commentary the task of present-
ing their own interpretation of the kārikā and to translate it in a way that could
somehow be supported by the Sanskrit, as, for example, resorting to the possible
3 In their translation of this parikṣā, S&K opt for reading karman as “object” rather than “action”.
The reason for this choice is that here Nāgārjuna would be following the terminology of the school
of Grammarians (S&K 2013: 89). Now, it is true that Candrakīrti glosses the first occurrence of
karman in the parikṣā in a vaiyākaraṇa fashion: kriyata iti karma kartarīpsitataṃ (PsP 180.14), that
is, “karman is what is done, i. e., the main objective of the agent” (or, literally, “what is most
desired by the agent”); this seems to justify the version of karman as “object” (even though it does
not exclude the possibility of rendering karman as “action”). However, the next two occurrences
of karman are glossed by the same commentator in a way that turns “action” into a more suitable
translation of it: in PsP 181.8–9, as an example of a karman with no agent, Candrakīrti gives the
“the fabrication/making (karaṇa) of a pot by the daughter of a barren woman” (karaṇa, in the
Grammarians’ terminology, would be the instrument of the action); in PsP 181.18, the example for
an agent with no karman, is “the [attribution of the] agency of an unforgivable sin for a not
committed (akṛta) unforgivable sin” (akṛtānantaryakarmaṇaḥ ānantaryakarmakārakatva).
So, given that the rendering “action” for karman is at least as (or more) likely as “object”,
I prefer the first option, because it seems to me that the dichotomy “agent/action” shows more
immediately than “agent/object” Nāgārjuna’s aim, in the eighth chapter of MMK, of proving that
the idea of katṛ/karaka and that of karman are reciprocally originated and dependent.
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version of “ca … ca” as “both … and”: “There is no activity with respect to a real
[entity], both [if] the agent were without action and if the actionwere without agent”.
MMK 9.12
prāk ca yo darśanādibhyaḥ sāṃprataṃ cōrdhvam eva ca |
na vidyate ’sti nāstīti nivṛttās tatra kalpanāḥ ||
What entity is prior to seeing and the rest, what entity is simultaneous, and what entity
comes after – these do not exist; the concepts of existence and nonexistence no longer
apply there – (S&K 2013: 106)
It seems to me that this translation does not clearly display the syntactical relation
between yo of pāda a and tatra of pāda d. We can also think that here na vidyate –
differently from the several occurrences within the MMK in which this formula
could be rendered as “does not exist” – has the more literal meaning of “is not
found”, “is not seen”. Lastly, it could be questioned whether the version of
nivṛttās as “no longer apply” is better than, for example, “cease”, or “vanish”.
A more intelligible translation of the stanza could be something like:
“Regarding that (tatra) which (yo) is not found prior, simultaneously and even
(eva) after to seeing, etc., the categories of existence and nonexistence cease”.
MMK 10.3cd
punarārambhavaiyarthyaṃ nityadīptaḥ prasajyate ||
It being permanently alight, it would follow that restarting is
pointless – (S&K 2013: 111)
Apparently, in this case, the translation does not follow the Sanskrit (of La
Vallée Poussin’s 1913 and de Jong’s 1977 editions) quoted by S&K but that of Ye’s
edition, which homologates the emendation proposed by MacDonald (2007: 46) of
nityadīptaḥ with nityadīpte. Indeed, while the locative absolute (with the implied
participle being) nityadīpte justifies the translation “it being permanently alight”,
the same translation does not seem appropriate for the nominative nityadīptaḥ.
MMK 12.84
syād ubhābhyāṃ kṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ syād ekaikakṛtaṃ yadi |
parākārāsvayaṃkāraṃ duḥkham āhetukaṃ5 kutaḥ ||
Suffering might be made by both self and other if it were made by one or the other.
4 In S&K’s translation, this kārikā is the ninth, because based on past editions of the MMK, they
consider as the sixth stanza of Chapter 12 a kārikā not included in Ye’s edition.
5 S&K do not accept MacDonald’s correction (2007: 34), homologated in Ye’s edition, of
ahetukaṃ (of La Vallée Poussin and de Jong’s editions) with āhetukaṃ, whose meaning, in
Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit, is the same as ahetukaṃ, but which is used here by Nāgārjuna for
metrical reasons.
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And how can there be a suffering not caused by self or other, or that is causeless? –
(S&K 2013: 134)
After ruling out, in previous kārikās, the possibility of auto- and hetero-causa-
tion of suffering, in this verse Nāgārjuna rejects the two remaining possibilities
of the tetralemma: (3) that suffering is both self- and other-made; (4) that
suffering is without cause.
In S&K’s translation, the presence of the disjunctive conjunction “or” (which
has no correspondence in the original Sanskrit) before the causeless hypothesis
makes us think that according to these authors the compound para-a-kāra-a-
svayaṃkāraṃ of the pāda c does not belong to the possibility (4) but is still
included in the hypothesis (3). However, this would be problematic, because it
would mean that Nāgārjuna, instead of ruling it out, is actually admitting the
hypothesis (3). Indeed, the answer to the – rhetorical – question “how can there
be a suffering not caused by self or other?” could only be that suffering is
definitely caused by self or other; and indeed in the half-verse ab it had been
said that the hypothesis (3) vindicates precisely under the condition that suffer-
ing “might be made by both self and other”.
Now, against this problematic conclusion, it seems clear that only the pādas ab
are actually committed to the hypothesis (3), whilst the whole part cd is devoted to
the exclusion of the possibility (4), that of a non-caused arising of suffering. So, the
translation of the pādas cd should be: “[And] how could there be a causeless
suffering, [that is, a suffering] whose author is neither itself nor other?”
We can observe here that Nāgārjuna makes explicit what in MMK 1.1 was
implicit, i. e., that the hypothesis “causeless” is nothing more than the fourth
possibility of the tetralemma, namely that of the “neither … nor”. After all, that
para-a-kāra-a-svayaṃkāraṃ is part of the fourth horn of a tetralemma is
confirmed by the fact that the source of this tetralemma is the word of the
Buddha, who, more than once, asserts the wrongness of the four hypotheses
of arising – of suffering, for example, in Saṃyutta Nikāya II.1.17; or of the self,
in Udāna VI.5.55 – according to the modalities: (1) sayaṃkata (“self-made”);
(2) paraṃkata (“other-made”); (3) sayaṃkata-paraṃkata (“self- and other-
made”) and, indeed, (4) asayaṃkāra aparaṃkāra adhicca (“causeless, [that
is,] neither self- nor other-made”).
MMK 13.2
tan mṛṣā moṣadharmaṃ yad yadi kiṃ tatra muṣyate |
etat tūktaṃ bhagavatā śūnyatāparidīpakam ||
If the Buddha’s statement ‘Whatever is deceptive in nature is vain’ is true, then what is
there about which one is deceived? This was said by the Blessed One for the illumina-
tion of emptiness – (S&K 2013: 139)
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The translation of the question – kiṃ tatra muṣyate – in pāda b looks unlikely
in all the contemporary versions of this kārikā that I consulted. Most fre-
quently, translators disregard the passive form of muṣyate, and propose solu-
tions such as: “What is there which deludes?” (Inada 1993: 92); “[W]hat, in that
case, is deceptive?” (Nietupski 1996: 126); “[W]hat deceives” (Garfield 1995:
208). More literal translations – such as, for example, “che cosa mai, allora, è
ingannato?” (Gnoli 1979: 81) or “what is deceived?” (Jones 2010: 15) – present
questions in such a way that it is not clear in which sense they could stem from
the statement of the first part of the half-verse: “if whatever is deceptive in
nature is vain”.
Other scholars choose to disregard the Sanskrit of the kārikā, reaching solutions
which, to my view, are hardly intelligible. For example: “[S]ur quoi porte alors la
déception?” (Bugault 2002: 170); “¿[Q]uéhay trás el engaño?” (Vélez deCea2003: 99).
S&K’s solution – based on Akutobhayā – has the virtue of providing an
intelligible reading of the entire verse. However, it could also be charged with
being textually unjustified, because it introduces into Nāgārjuna’s question a
subject (“one”) and an indirect complement (“about which”) which have no
correspondence in the Sanskrit of the verse.
My proposal for dealing with this kārikā is to start from a simile that
we find in Buddhapālita’s commentary, which says that, “if [something]
were deceived, robbers (caura) would also attack the wealth of a Pāśupata
(a worshipper of Śiva Paśupati) and a Nirgrantha (a naked Jaina)”
(BPV. tr. Saito 1984: 180). Now, the Pāśupatas and the Nirgranthas are naked
ascetics, who have no goods at all, so it is impossible to rob something from
them. This simile consents to surmise that Nāgārjuna, in pāda b of his verse, is
using the verb √muṣ in its primary meaning – different from the one from
which the noun moṣa derives – of “to steal, rob, subtract” and that, therefore,
the half-verse ab could be read as “if whatever is deceptive in nature is false,
what is here subtracted?”.6
This reading makes perfect sense if we consider that the stanza, according to
all the ancient commentators, is Nāgārjuna’s reply to a charge of nihilism (by
opponents of the Mādhyamikas) occasioned by the previous verse, which asserts
6 The idea of “subtraction” or “theft” is present in the translation of this kārikā suggested by Oetke
(1992: 206), who, however, does not consider the half-verse ab as Nāgārjuna’s reply to the objection
that the commentators identify at the end of their gloss of the previous stanza, but rather as the
objection of one of Nāgārjuna’s opponents, to which the part cd of the verse would reply. Oetke’s
version is: “Objection: If that which has the dharma of theft/fraud is false/feigned, what [is it then
which] becomes ‘robbed’/feigned (i. e. feigned as being otherwise than it actually is) ( =What is the
bearer of the dharma of ‘theft’/fraud)? Answer: The Venerable has said this as a means of kindling/
stimulating/indicating emptiness”.
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that, according to the Buddha, all dharmas are illusory. Therefore, to an oppo-
nent who insinuates that saying that “all dharmas exist deceptively” is the same
as saying that “nothing exists”, Nāgārjuna replies that, given that all dharmas
are illusory, there is no existence that is subtracted to them by the contentions of
Mādhyamikas: in the same way as it is impossible to steal goods that do not exist
(or, according to the image of MMK 7.31, in the same way as it is impossible to
cut a head that does not exist, because it was already cut),7 it is also impossible
to subtract an inexistent existence.
MMK 13.3
bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam anyathābhāvadarśanāt |
nāsvabhāvaś ca bhāvo ’sti bhāvānāṃ śūnyatā yataḥ ||
[Objection:] For existents there is lack of intrinsic nature, because
they are seen to alter.
There is no [ultimately real] existent that is without intrinsic nature,
due to the emptiness of existents – (S&K 2013: 140)
S&K’s translation rests on a gloss of the Akutobhayā that suggests that the
word bhāva, in pādas a and d, means “existents” in the sense of “person and other
things that are composite in the first sense”, whilst the “existents” in pāda c “are
dharmas, things that are only composite in the second sense” (S&K 2013: 140).8
The supposition that Nāgārjuna uses the same word, within the same
kārikā, in two different meanings (that is, in Fregean vocabulary, the same
name with two different references) gives rise to perplexities which would be
drastically reduced only if it were proved that the Akutobhayā is actually a
svavṛtti. On the other hand, if the meaning of bhāva were the same within
pādas c and d, the translation of the verse proposed by S&K would be asserting
something totally inconsistent, like “no existent is empty, due to the emptiness
of existents”.
7 The fact that Saito, in his translation of the BPV, introduces the paradox of the two naked ascetics
being robbed with “if something were deceived” and not “if something were robbed” could arise
from the circumstance that the Tibetan translator of Buddhapālita’s vṛtti – not grasping the semantic
nuance that allows the Indians to play with the double meaning (“to steal” and “to deceive”) of
√muṣ and consents thatmoṣa and muṣyate, in Nāgārjuna’s kārikā, means respectively “deceptive”
and “is subtracted” – uses the same word slu to render both the words.
8 As MacDonald (2015: 360) does not fail to underline, S&K’s translation – here and elsewhere –
of saṃskāra as “composite thing” instead of “conditioned thing” is inappropriate. As
Stcherbatsky (1923: 40, note 1) puts it: “The translation of saṃskṛta-dharma as ‘compound’ is a
contraditio in adjecto. A dharma is never compound, it is always simples. Wherever there is
composition there are several dharmas.”
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S&K consider this kārikā as the objection of a “substantialist” opponent of
Mādhyamikas, who, in the half-verse ab, recognizes that phenomenal entities
(things and persons) actually lack intrinsic nature; in pāda c he asserts that,
instead, dharmas have intrinsic nature and, in pāda d, that this intrinsic nature
is nothing more than the very emptiness.9
This reading is endorsed by other contemporary authors who, however, in
order to justify it, have to somehow strain – like S&K do inasmuch as they give
different meanings to the occurrences of bhāva within the verse – the Sanskrit
text.10 They, nonetheless, find support in the commentaries of Candrakīrti and
Bhāviveka, who actually present the verse as the point of view of an opponent of
Nāgārjuna.
Yet, this reading is neither the only possible nor the most convincing read-
ing of MMK 13.8. Indeed, the BPV offers a different explication of this kārikā,
according to which it expresses a genuine point of view of Nāgārjuna (and not
that of an opponent):
As a thing without own-nature does not exist and the emptiness of things has also been
taught, therefore, we should understand that he stated «things are without own-nature»
because the nature of things is inconstant and they are seen to alter.11
9 In other words, the opponent would be pointing out a prasaṅga consequence in Nāgārjuna’s
position: his exclusion of the own nature of everything implies that all entities have emptiness
as their own nature.
10 Oetke, for example, besides his main translation (Oetke 1992: 206), which presents the
content of this kārikā as an authentic Nāgārjunian point of view, offers an alternative reading
(Oetke 1992: 207, n. 19), which would express the objection of one of Nāgārjuna’s opponent.
However, according to the same scholar, in order to support this alternative version, it is
necessary to differentiate the meanings of niḥsvabhāvatva of pāda a (to be understood as
“essenceless/lack of own nature”) and asvabhāva (“essenceless/without own nature”) – a
straining that, even though it “should not be ruled out”, is qualified by Oetke as “slightly
artificial”.
Also, Nietupski (1996: 117 e 127–128) presents this verse as an anti-Madhyamaka position. Yet,
in order to do this, he inserts a negation in part ab of the kārikā which allows him to read pāda
a as “There is no lack of self-nature”: a sentence that, with no need of specifications, could well
be pronounced by one of Nāgārjuna’s opponents. However, obviously, the problem is that
within the Sanskrit of the half-verse ab there is nothing at all that allows for the presence of a
“no” in the English translation.
Another reading of MMK 13.3 as the point of view of an opponent is that of Inada (1993: 92):
“(The opponent contends) […] From the perception of varying natures all entities are without
self-nature. An entity without self-nature does not exist because all entities have the nature of
śūnyatā”.
The translation of part cd is very clear, but definitely not faithful, as long as the original text
does not justify a sentence like “all entities have the nature of”.
11 BPV, tr. Saito 1984: 181.
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That the position expressed by pādas ab – “the fact that things change is a
proof that they have not intrinsic nature” – could be authentically madhya-
maka is unquestionable. In order to consider madhyamaka also the half-
kārikā cd, it is only necessary to read pāda c (nāsvabhāvaś ca bhāvo ’sti),
rather than “there is no existent that is without intrinsic nature” (which in
fact does not seem to express a Nāgārjunian position) as “an entity with no
intrinsic nature does not [ultimately] exist”: also, a very typical madhyamaka
statement.
Finally, if we give to the yataḥ of pāda d – as suggested by Bugault
(2002: 171) – a consecutive (“en suite de quoi”) and not a causal (“puisque” or
“due to”) meaning, we get a translation like:
“For entities there is lack of intrinsic nature, because they are seen
to alter.
An entity with no intrinsic nature does not [ultimately] exist – therefore [we
teach] the emptiness of entities.”
It can be observed that this solution, inasmuch as it does not require any
forcing of Nāgārjuna’s text (such as the one that ascribes different meanings to
the three occurrences of the word bhāva within the kārikā), is more “econom-
ical” than the one presented by S&K.12
MMK 20.10
janayet phalam utpannaṃ niruddho ’staṃgataḥ katham |
hetus tiṣṭhann api kathaṃ phalena janayed vṛtaḥ ||
How could what is ceased and ended produce an arisen effect?
How, on the other hand, could a cause that is connected with the
effect, though enduring, produce that effect? – (S&K 2013: 220)
The word that S&K translate as “connected” is vṛtaḥ, probably because the
gloss of vṛta offered by Candrakīrti is saṃbaddha, which actually could be firstly
rendered as “connected” or “bounded”.
The problem is, however, that the idea of “connection” is not present within
the semantic range of vṛta, which rather means “concealed” or “covered”. So, in
this case, instead of extending the sense of “connection” to vṛtaḥ, it seems more
appropriate to give to the saṃbaddha used by Candrakīrti a sense that is more
close to “concealing”, such as, for example, “enveloped” or “wrapped”.
It seems, in conclusion, that Nāgārjuna, after excluding, within part ab of
this kārikā, that a ceased cause could produce any effect, in cd denies that a
12 The reading of kārikā 13.3 as expressing the point of view of Nāgārjuna and not that of an
opponent is shared by many contemporary translators, such as Garfield 1995, Kalupahana 2006,
Bugault 2002 or Gnoli 1979.
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cause (like a seed) could produce anything while “continuing to exist” (tiṣṭhan)
concealed by the effect (the sprout): “How, on the other hand, could an enduring
cause, wrapped by the effect, produce?”
MMK 23.7
rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca ṣaḍvidham |
vastu rāgasya doṣasya mohasya ca vikalpyate ||
[Opponent:] Concerning desire, aversion, and delusion, there is
constructed six kind of object taken as real – color, sound, taste, touch,
smell, and the object of inner sense (dharmas) – (S&K 2013: 257)
The choice of translating vikalpyate as “there is constructed” and vastu as
“object taken as real” leads to quite a confused version of this kārikā.
Candrakīrti (PsP 456.6) glosses vastu with ālambana, “objective support”.
Bhāviveka explains asmin vasatīti vastu as “[b]ecause (something) dwells in
this, it is an object” (translation by Ames 1986: 327). So, according to these
commentators vastu should be understood as “base” or “substrate”. On the
other side, there is no apparent reason to translate vi√kḷp as “to construct”
rather than “to conceive”, “to imagine” or “to surmise”.
Thus, a clearer translation of the verse would be: “Color, sound, taste,
touch, smell and the object of inner sense – [this] is conceived as the sixfold
substrate of desire, aversion and delusion”.
MMK 23.9
aśubhaṃ vā śubhaṃ vāpi kutas teṣu bhaviṣyati |
māyāpuruṣakalpeṣu pratibimbasameṣu ca ||
How will their [determination] as either bad or good come to be,
when they [colors, etc.] are like the image of an illusory person and
the same as a [mere] reflection? – (S&K 2013: 258)
A minor remark, extended to the translation of the whole chapter, is that the
choice – upheld by S&K since the first verse – to render aśubha and śubha as
“bad” and “good” does not seem the most felicitous; as a base of “aversion”
(dveṣa) and “desire” (rāga), the pair “pleasant/unpleasant” (which, however,
the two authors – p. 255 – consider) seems more appropriate.
Regarding the rest of this kārikā, the interpretation of teṣu
māyāpuruṣakalpeṣu pratibimbasameṣu ca as a locative absolute is questionable.
The reading of it as a simple place complement would allow for a translation
that seems more sound: “How will either the unpleasant or the pleasant come to
be in regard to those [perceptions that are] like the image of an illusory person
and the same as a [mere] reflection?”.
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MMK 24.13
śūnyatāyām adhilayaṃ yaṃ punaḥ kurute bhavān |
doṣaprasaṅgo nāsmākaṃ sa śūnye nōpapadyate ||
Moreover, the objection that you make concerning emptiness
cannot be a faulty consequence for us or for emptiness – (S&K 2013: 275)
The insertion of “or” between asmākaṃ (a genitive) and śūnye (a locative)
seems a bit arbitrary. A more precise translation would be: “Moreover, the
objection that you make concerning emptiness is not a faulty consequence of
ours, [for] it does not apply to the empty”.13
MMK 24.23
svabhāvaparyavasthānān nirodhaṃ pratibādhase ||
You deny cessation through your maintaining intrinsic nature – (S&K
2013: 280)
The meaning of paryava√sthā, which in “classical” Sanskrit is something
like “to be firm” (and then, by extension, also “to maintain”), in “Buddhist
hybrid Sanskrit” is rather that of “to be possessed, ensnared”, which justifies a
translation such as: “Being obsessed by [the notion of] intrinsic nature, you deny
cessation”.
MMK 24.25
yadā duḥkhaṃ samudayo nirodhaś ca na vidyate |
mārgo duḥkhanirodhaṃ tvāṃ katamaḥ/katamaṃ prāpayiṣyati ||
When there is neither suffering nor the arising and cessation of
suffering,
then, what kind of path will lead you to the cessation of suffering? –
(S&K 2013: 281)
Of the two corrections to the editions La Vallée Poussin (1913) and de Jong
(1977) proposed by MacDonald (2007: 38–40) and homologated in Ye’s edition
(2011) – (1) duḥkhanirodhaṃ tvāṃ instead of duḥkhanirodhatvāt and (2) katamaṃ
instead katamaḥ14 – S&K only accept the first. In fact, the translation of Ye’s
13 In a personal communication of May 2014, MacDonald told me that there are textual
indications (such as the manuscript of Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā used by
Jñānagarbha and Klu’I rgyal mtshan for its translation in Tibetan) that support the reading
doṣa-prasaṅgena-asmākaṃ instead of doṣa-prasaṅga nâsmākaṃ. This would lead to a transla-
tion like: “Moreover, the objection that you – by ascribing to us a faulty consequence – make to
emptiness does not apply to the empty”.
14 The Sanskrit of La Vallée Poussin and de Jong’s editions compels us to translations that are
actually quite unalike, such as, for example: “When suffering as well as its arising and ceasing
are not evident, through the cessation of suffering where will the path lead to?” (Kalupahana
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version would be: “When there is neither suffering nor the arising and cessation
of suffering, what kind of cessation of suffering will the path bestow to you?”.
So, according to Ye’s edition, what would be in question, here, would be (again)
the “kind of cessation” and not (in tune with La Vallée Poussin and de Jong’s
editions) the “kind of path”.
S&K’s version – which seems to be confirmed by Candrakīrti – is equally (if
not more) logical than the one based on the emended Sanskrit. Nonetheless, it
would be interesting to know if S&K have some consistent argument for accept-
ing just a part of MacDonald correction.
MMK 27.4
sa evātmēti tu bhaved upādānaṃ viśiṣyate |
upādānavinirmukta ātmā te katamaḥ punaḥ ||
If it were that ‘That is just myself’ [then appropriation would not be
distinct from the appropriator ‘I’]; however, appropriation is distinct.
How, on the other hand, can your self be utterly distinct from appropriation? – (S&K
2013: 320)
S&K’s translation here seems too free and not very clear. The insertion, in the
first half-verse, of the reflexive first person pronoun (“myself”) – even though
Nāgārjuna quotes, in the previous verses, the point of view of one who says
“I existed in the past” or “I did not exist” – does not seem justified.
Moreover, for the intelligibility of the verse, the rendering of sa eva as
“identical” or “the same” would be better than as “that is just” chosen by
S&K. As regards the option of translating upādāna in a literal fashion, as
“appropriation”, with no remittal (for example, in brackets) to the notion of
skandha – which here and elsewhere within the MMK is implied15 – does not
facilitate the comprehension of Nāgārjuna’s words. Finally the rendering of
the te of pāda d as a possessive adjective (“your”) is questionable; rather, it
seems better to translate this pronoun, as in many other cases in the previous
verses, as “according to you”.
In conclusion, also taking into account Candrakīrti’s commentary, the trans-
lation of this kārikā could be as follows: “but, [if you think that] the self [of the
previous and the present existences] was the same, [you should consider that]
the [skandhas of] appropriation are different. [For] how [would be], according to
you, a self utterly distinct from the [skandhas of] appropriation?”.
2006: 345); or: “Puisque […] il n’existe ni douler, ni origine, ni arrêt, comment déduire
[l’existence du] chemin, puisqu’il [se définit par] l’arrêt de la doleur”? (May 1959: 242).
15 Also in the case of this verse, Candrakīrti does not fail to explain that upādāna is “desig-
nated by the five skandhas” (PsP 574.13).
670 Rezensionen – Comptes rendus – Reviews
In other words, the hypothesis that the past and the present selves are the
same thing would imply also that the psycho-physical features (i. e., the
skandhas) associated with the past self are identical to those of the present
self – unless we consider the self, like part cd of the verse suggests, as some-
thing totally different from the aggregates. However, as pāda b remarks, the
aggregates of the previous life are undoubtedly different from those of the
present existence.
MMK 27.10
yadi hy ayaṃ bhaved anyaḥ pratyākhyāyāpi taṃ bhavet |
tathaiva ca sa saṃtiṣṭhet tatra jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ ||
For if this present self were indeed distinct from the past, then it would exist even if the
past were denied.
And the past person would abide just as it was, or it would be born here without having
died – (S&K 2013: 323)
It seems to me that here too S&K’s translation is not very intelligible.
In the second half-verse the syntactical paper of tatra in pāda d is proble-
matic, for it could be (1) a locative adverb of saṃtiṣṭhet, (2) of jayeta, (3) of amṛtaḥ,
or (4) a conjunctive adverb (or a clause, like “that is to say” with an explicative
function) which introduces the sentence jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ.
S&K choose (2), which is the only option that could not rely on Sanskrit and
Tibetan versions of Candrakīrti’s PsP (cf. May, 1959, p. 285, note 1040).
Moreover, they consider the ca of pāda d as a disjunctive conjunction (“or”)
introducing the final clause (that is, jāyeta câmṛtaḥ), i.e., they conceive the two
clauses of the second half-verse to be mutually exclusive. Finally, they deem the
subject of all verbs (namely, saṃtiṣṭhet, jāyeta and amṛtaḥ) of cd to be the same,
that is, “the past person”.
Differently from S&K “solutions”, my understanding of pādas cd, in the
first place, considers tatra – relying on PsP 579.5–6 – according to option (1),
that is, as a locative adverb of saṃtiṣṭhet; secondly, it reads ca as a copulative
conjunction (“and”), which gives the final clause the function of explaining
the first part of the half-verse; thirdly, given that the hypothesis criticized in
this kārikā is that the past and the present selves are different, and relying on
Candrakīrti’s example (cf. PsP 579.6–7) of the cloth that, being different from
the pot, is not destroyed by the appearance of the pot, it seems appropriate to
assume that the subject of saṃtiṣṭhet and amṛtaḥ is the past self, whilst the
subject of jāyeta is the present one. In other words, here Nāgārjuna is saying
that the consequence of thinking of the past and the present selves as being
different from each other is that the former would still abide here, that is, it
would not have died yet, whilst the latter would already be born.
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In conclusion, my translation of this verse is: “For if this [present self] was
other [than the past], it would exist even independently from that [past]. But [in
this case], that [past self] would abide here just as it was, and [it] would not have
died [yet], whilst [the present self] would [already] be born”.
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